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Abstract
The high price of some cancer drugs has recently come under attack by the medical profession. We examine
the reasons behind the pricing strategies of cancer drugs. On the one hand, prices should reflect value and
research demonstrates that the health benefits from novel cancer drugs have been enormous in terms of
additional years of life patients can now enjoy. This provides some justification for the high price tag of these
drugs. On the other hand, drug pricing is also a product of a hidebound reimbursement system that does a
poor job in letting prices adjust to new information about value. Regulators set thresholds for cost-
effectiveness, which establishes not only a price ceiling but also a price floor. Manufacturers often price drugs
high at launch in efforts to recoup their initial investment, but a more efficient system would allow prices to
both rise and fall over time. Removing distortions in the reimbursement system is crucial to ensuring
continued success in saving lives.
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Abstract: The high price of some cancer drugs has recently come under attack by the 
medical profession. We examine the reasons behind the pricing strategies of cancer 
drugs. On the one hand, prices should reflect value and research demonstrates that 
the health benefits from novel cancer drugs have been enormous in terms of addi-
tional years of life patients can now enjoy. This provides some justification for the 
high price tag of these drugs. On the other hand, drug pricing is also a product of 
a hidebound reimbursement system that does a poor job in letting prices adjust to 
new information about value. Regulators set thresholds for cost-effectiveness, which 
establishes not only a price ceiling but also a price floor. Manufacturers often price 
drugs high at launch in efforts to recoup their initial investment, but a more efficient 
system would allow prices to both rise and fall over time. Removing distortions in 
the reimbursement system is crucial to ensuring continued success in saving lives.
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A group of distinguished international cancer physicians recently joined together 
to decry what they called the “astronomical, unsustainable, and perhaps even 
immoral” prices of cancer drugs.1 In the name of saving patients, they appealed 
to drug manufacturers to lower their prices.
The group’s remarks made for important political theater in the policy debate 
over healthcare costs. But they skirted the question of why the drugs’ prices are 
high to begin with. In large part, drug manufacturers are locked into an approval 
and reimbursement system that distorts the underlying value of their products and 
makes high initial prices the best option for recouping their investment. In fact, 
some regulators set thresholds for cost-effectiveness, which sets not only a price 
ceiling but also a price floor. Introducing pricing flexibility into these systems, 
1 Kantarjian et al. (2013).
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which would enable drug prices to both rise and fall in response to new information 
about a drug’s value, is crucial to ensuring that patients get the drugs they need.
The cancer physicians focused on their specialty, a relatively rare form of 
cancer called chronic myelogenous leukemia, or CML. Before the development 
of imatinib – the novel cancer drug, popularly known as Gleevec, used to treat 
CML – 80 percent of patients diagnosed with the disease died within 10 years. 
Imatinib lowered that rate to 20 percent – a reduction so dramatic that patients 
“now live close to normal life spans.”2
The physicians argued that a drug’s price – Gleevec costs $76,000 per year – 
“must reflect worth.” So what is the “worth” of those extensions in lifespan that 
CML patients enjoy? Our research shows that imatinib, manufactured by Novartis, 
created more than $88 billion in social value in terms of patients’ survival gains 
and drug-company profits over the lifetime of CML patients.3 What is Novartis’ 
cut? The answer is 10 percent, a fraction typical for a range of other cancer drugs: 
our research finds patients enjoy between 81 percent and 95 percent of the social 
value that drugs create, with manufacturers earning a minority of social welfare 
in terms of profits.4
The oncologists readily acknowledged that drug manufacturers deserve 
some positive return on their investments in order to encourage them to spend 
billions more on new drug research. Recouping 10 percent of the total value of 
cancer-drug innovations doesn’t seem unreasonable, given that these drugs will 
eventually lose patent protection and that, over their lifetimes, they are far more 
cost-effective than pricing at their launch would suggest.5
But securing such a return on investment, short of high initial prices, is virtu-
ally impossible in our current drug approval and reimbursement system. The key 
problem is that information on survival benefits and the range of diseases a drug 
can treat often trickles out slowly over time and after a drug is on the market, but 
prices – which are often dictated by regulators both here and abroad – do not 
adjust to reflect changes to the drug’s value.
Traditionally, an experimental drug’s approval was predicated on demon-
strating that it improved patients’ survival rates vis-à-vis those under standard 
care. But waiting for differences in overall survival rates to show up can delay 
approval up to 10 years or more, blocking patients’ access to potentially helpful 
therapies and driving up the costs of developing drugs.
2 Kantarjian et al. (2013).
3 Yin et al. (2012).
4 Lakdawalla et al. (2010).
5 Lu et al. (2012).
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Recognizing these issues, regulators around the world, including the Food 
and Drug Administration, have started to consider “surrogate endpoints” when 
evaluating new drugs.6 One such biological endpoint is tumor size, which is 
predictive of clinical outcomes like survival. In 2006, the FDA approved Sutent 
for treatment of both gastrointestinal and kidney cancers based on the drug’s 
ability to slow tumor growth.7 More conservative European regulators also allow 
surrogate endpoints, at least in conjunction with other outcome measures, when 
approving a drug.8
But approval and reimbursement are very different decisions. Progress on the 
approval front has collided with a hidebound reimbursement system. Even if the 
FDA approves a drug based on surrogate endpoints, insurers may be reluctant to 
reimburse for a treatment that hasn’t yet demonstrated a survival benefit. This 
problem is exacerbated in cases where the drug is very expensive.
Consider the case of the immunotherapy drug Provenge for prostate cancer, 
which costs $93,000 for a course of treatment. The FDA denied approval in 2007 
despite a positive recommendation from its own advisory panel, only to approve 
the drug 3 years later. It took another year before Medicare would pay for it. The 
official reason given for Medicare’s holdup was to evaluate the drug’s off-label 
uses, but doctors, including the American Society of Clinical Oncology, read the 
lack of immediate coverage as a consequence of the drug’s high price tag.9
So what can be done?
Determining a drug’s value at its launch is difficult. Over time, for example, 
we sometimes learn that a drug can help treat conditions not considered at the 
time of its debut, which should theoretically increase its value. In fact, the FDA 
approved imatinib to treat the most common form of pediatric cancer, acute lym-
phoblastic leukemia, in January.10 This expanded use of imatinib may make that 
drug’s value higher than our $88 billion estimate for CML alone.
But the current reimbursement system is simply not designed to absorb this 
new information and, as a result, is horribly inefficient in fairly matching a drug’s 
value to its price. Think of a stock market insensitive to new information: On what 
basis would you determine the value of a company?
If regulators raised prices with evidence of added value, manufacturers 
would have less incentive to set high prices at a drug’s launch. And regulators 
could argue for lower reimbursement until new clinical evidence arose to support 
6 Garrido and Mangiapane (2009).
7 Food and Drug Administration (2006).
8 Garrido and Mangiapane (2009).
9 Pharmalot (2010).
10 Wall Street Journal (2013).
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higher prices. Drug prices would thus reflect their underlying value, and products 
would get to market sooner.
But right now, insurers and regulators such as Medicare are trapped on the 
wrong path, where no one has an incentive to adjust prices. A private insurer 
won’t offer to pay more than its competitors if a drug becomes more valuable, so 
prices don’t rise. And Medicare follows private insurers by reimbursing based on 
average sales prices. In economic parlance, we are stuck at a bad equilibrium. 
We might look to Medicare, as the largest payer, to break out of the mold since, 
according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), cancer drugs comprise 
over 40 percent of the most expensive medications under Medicare Part B. With 
Medicare taking the lead, private insurers might be forced to follow.
In many respects, we are winning the war on cancer, with patients living 
longer thanks largely to innovative treatments. Making cancer drug prices sensi-
tive to new information, whether beneficial or disappointing, would help ensure 
continued success in saving lives.
Previously published online July 26, 2013
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